

WSM, DECEMBER 2, 1945

Good Morning, Friends:

Congress has had a busy but unspectatular week working on more or less routine legislation but else where in the Nation's Capital the week was characterized by political fireworks. For instance, General Patrick Hurley not only resigned as our Ambassador to China but gave a terrific blast ^{at} to the State Department or rather to certain elements within the State Department.

From some of my friends, I have learned something of the story. ^{behind the story.} Some of the friends have been associated with General Hurley in China, others have been connected with the OWI and State Department. Here seems to be the story back of General Hurley's resignation. Several months ago, ^{regarding China.} in the midst of the war, this government had to make a fundamental decision. It was a choice between preserving Chiang Kai-shek's government in China or letting it fall to pieces. Certain elements within the State Department, some representatives of the OWI and some of our ^{mil} leaders in China, particularly General Joseph Stilwell, with whom I talked about this subject several weeks ago in a quonset hut on Okinawi, were completely out of sympathy with Chiang Kai-shek. They branded him as a dictator, branded his machine as corrupt, undemocratic and undependable.

Another school of thought held that Chiang Kai-shek, despite his ^{recog} acknowledged faults, was the only leader in China upon whom we could depend to hold the nation together and ^{to} ~~continue~~ continue even a modicum of national organized resistance to the Japanese.

The decision finally had to be made by President Roosevelt himself. He decided that we would support Chiang Kai-shek's government, and he issued instructions to our representatives to this effect.

General Stilwell, as you will recall, was recalled from his command in China and returned home only later to be called by General MacArthur for a post of high command in the Pacific Theater. General Hurley has undertaken to execute the policy laid down by President Roosevelt and continued by President Truman. It seems, however, that ^{some of} ~~those~~ of our representatives in both our foreign service personnel or diplomatic corps and the OWI who originally doubted and distrusted Chiang Kai-Shek continued not only to doubt the wisdom of the policy of supporting him but, in some cases at least, seemed to have taken action to thwart ^{+ undermine} ~~the~~ policy. At least this is the story told by General Hurley and his aides who were loyal to him.

^{So,} General Hurley's complaint was not that he did not have a policy to follow but rather that the State Department was not unified in the policy and that ^{therefore} ~~in~~ the execution of the policy his efforts were being undermined not only in China but in the State Department here in Washington.

Now let us look at the other side. Some members of the State Department and OWI expressed it as their candid opinion that General Hurley had become such a partisan supporter of Chiang Kai-shek that he had lost his effectiveness as a unifying influence for us in China. They have felt and still feel that the ultimate end of our policy of supporting the national government in China is to unify the nation behind one national government rather than to have China split into two divisions -- one under Chiang Kai-shek in the South and the other under the communists in the North -- which they feared that General Hurley's exceedingly partisan and, what they termed as uncompromising attitude, ^{his} was promoting.

It will be recalled that it was only a few weeks ago that General Hurley was in Washington but returned to China to continue his work. > I believe it only fair to say that ~~there is~~ there is a considerable feeling here that General Hurley's

blast had a decided element of bad taste. I have heard remarks to the effect that if it was as bad as General Hurley now says it was then why did he return to China only six or seven weeks ago. I have heard others ask the question, "Why didn't General Hurley at least let the President and the Secretary of State know that he contemplated resigning?" "Why," other^s asked, "Did he indicate to the Secretary of the State and to the President one day that he would return ^{to China,} only to give a blast to the newspapers the next day before even notifying the President and the Secretary of State that he had changed his mind?" Despite this element of bad taste, however, the fundamentals ~~effects~~ of the situation can not be ignored. General Hurley's action has brought about at least two concrete and beneficial results. The first is that it has prompted the President to give assurances that he will make a public announcement of our Chinese policy as well as his instructions for executing it. It is said that General Hurley requested just this ~~but did~~ be done before he returned to China some six weeks ago. It ~~was~~ ^{this} also said that was promised him but ~~had~~ ^{was} not been forthcoming. Be that as it may, the President has now said that there will be a public statement and a publication of his instructions.

The second concrete result of General Hurley's resignation is the appointment as Ambassador to China of one of our top flight Americans, General George C. Marshall, all be it, not a professional diplomat, but truly a scholar and statesman. So, with a public statement of our Chinese policy and with General Marshall as our Ambassador much of the confusion should be cleared, and at least our own government employees ~~would~~ both here and in China will know what the policy is and their duty to go along with it despite their personal disagreement therewith.

The United State cannot, in my opinion, be too careful with what we do in the Orient. What we do on the Continent of Asia is, in my opinion, far more important for the next fifty years than what we do in Japan. For in Southeastern Asia is reposed almost one-half the entire population of the world. Unorganized and unindustrialized, they constitute no great power^{now,} but once organized, ^{reorganized &} industrialized they loom as a great ~~potential~~ force.

Our troubles in occupying Germany also hit the headlines by a statement from Mr. Byron Price who as a representative of the President has been making a study of the situation in Germany for the last ten weeks. Some of you may recall that about a year ago now I went to Germany and made a study of military government for the government and at that time I predicted that what Mr. Price now says is true would happen if the Allies proceeded upon the policies then in contemplation. Mr. Bryon Price is recognized as a man of capacity and discriminating judgment as well as being an objective reporter of his findings. To me it is perfectly astounding that this representative of the President not only says that we face failure in our occupation policy but poses the question of whether the United States should pull out of Germany and admit the failure of its occupation policy after considerably less than one year of occupation government. Have we forgotten our war objectives? Have we forgotten so soon our determination to strike down and rout out Natzism? Can we so soon forget ~~again~~ that ~~twice~~ within a gerneration Germany has instigated two world wars? Surely we will not so soon abandon our efforts. It is one thing to admit the failure of our policy thus far; perhaps that would be wise, but it is still another to say that we will not try again. Our whole policy of military government needs to be reexamined and rethought and it needs to be considered in the light

of long term objectives rather than in the spirit of yielding to expediencies.

Mr. Price criticizes the French. Well, I am not so sure the French are not right. France does not want a strong Germany. There are some people in the United States and an even larger percentage in Great Britain who want a strong but a good Germany. ~~It is a question as to which comes first.~~ Her records ^{does} for more than one hundred years ~~to~~ not show her to be good when she is strong. As for me, I want some assurances that Germany will be good before we again make her or permit her to become strong.