

WSM OCTOBER 21, 1945

Good Morning, Friends:

The two principal developments in Washington during the past week had to do with our future military policy. President Truman made known his plans to address Congress next Tuesday in recommendation of some form of universal military training.

The Senate ^{military affair} Committee began hearings and consideration of a bill to merge the army and navy and air corps into a single department of national defense. The makings of a great debate are shaping up in Congress over the question of the size, the type and the manner of raising our future peacetime military forces.

At one time, the sentiment in Congress seemed to be very strongly in favor of some form of universal military training, whereby all young men would be required to devote some minimum period, of ^{say} six months or a year, to ^{training in} the fundamentals of military ^{service} ~~training~~ and discipline. This sentiment, ^{however} has decidedly sagged, ~~however~~, since the world's shocking revelation of the atomic bomb. Many Members of the House and Senate now feel that our security lies more nearly in scientific research and productive capacity than in large standing or reserve forces of men trained in the use of rifles, mortars, and long Toms. We will have to wait until President Truman delivers his message to know just what he ~~will~~ recommend^s but it is the general impression here that he will make a recommendation ~~in~~ not very different from that already advocated by General Marshall. The ~~President's recommendation~~ President's recommendation and message will be discussed on this program next Sunday morning.

Secretary of War Patterson, Army Chief of Staff General Marshall and General Henry H. Arnold appeared before the Senate Military Committee and all three urged that the army and the navy and the air corps be merged into a single department of national defense. ~~The Navy is fighting this program.~~

> It will be recalled that in the beginning we had one department of war and under that department all military operations were administered. Later, a separate department of the Navy was created, and, more recently, there have been movements to create a separate department for air warfare. Our experiences in the war however, have convinced a great many people that instead of further division all three branches of the service should be merged into one. I am certainly convinced that this should be done for two main reasons: One, it would bring about a more coordinated and more efficient ~~and~~ military system and, second, it would cost a great deal less.

I have seen duplication, rivalry ~~and~~, over-lapping and jealousy between the Army and Navy. In the early stages of the war the Army and Navy were bidding against each other for war products. The result was not more planes ^{more} not ^{more} ammunition but a higher price which the taxpayers had to pay. Why, just across the Potomac River from Washington there is a Navy air field and an Army air field with little more than a fence separating them. The Army has an air transport command, the Navy has an air transport system. Each have separate fields, separate radio communication systems, separate ground ~~and~~ maintenance crews, separate commanding officers which means unnecessary ^{and} ~~and~~ ^{excessive} ~~additional~~ use of men, equipment and money. In saying this I am not talking about something I have just read about, I have seen it throughout the Pacific

and on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in many places in the United States.

I talked with him about this in Manila only a few days before the Jap surrender. He gave example after example of the ^{extraneous} waste and inefficiency that had resulted from having three separate military organizations and, what is most important in war, he gave reason after reason why a unification of command and admin. org. would bring about more efficient use of our mil. might.

Well, husky braked

John L. Lewis suddenly called off the coal strike. ^{The miners have gone back to work and the coal mine operators are contemplating a strike.} ~~and~~ meanwhile President

Truman discussed with his Cabinet a new wage-price policy which he hopes will minimize industrial disputes. Both the President and Cabinet Members, however, declined to ^{disclose} ~~tell~~ the nature of the discussion. It was indicated, though, that the President may make some disclosure of a new policy ^{soon} ~~next week~~. It seems to be generally understood here that the Administration will eventually approve some wage increases even though they necessitate price increases. President Truman however did made the statement during the week that it ^{is} ~~was~~ still the policy of his Administration that wage increases would be approved where the increases could be given without resulting in price increases. [↑] To try to separate wages

from prices is like a dog trying to out run a tin can tied to his tail. (P)

The Pres knows that
If Wages ^{Prices} go up, the other must go up.

The Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson said that meat rationing will continue through November and he said that this decision stemmed largely from commitments to supply meat to foreign countries.

Army-Navy Merger: For Wartime Only?

An Intimate Message

By William H. Stringer

WASHINGTON

Probably one of the best arguments in favor of merger of the Army and Navy was delivered by forceful Admiral William F. Halsey in addressing his South Pacific Fighting Force back in 1942. Said he:

"We are the South Pacific Fighting Force. I don't want anybody to be even thinking in terms of the Army, Navy, and Marines. Every man must understand it . . . and will understand it if I have to take off all uniforms, issue coveralls, and imprint the insignia 'South Pacific Fighting Force' on the seat of the pants."

The Senate Military Affairs Committee, now hearing testimony from top Army and Navy officials on proposals to merge the armed forces, is climaxing a debate which has been waged intermittently for half a century. Both Army and Navy agree today on the need for consolidation of effort in wartime. The sharp difference of opinion lies in how concentrated this co-ordination should be, and whether the merger should be permanently welded or permitted to pull apart, once a war emergency is past.

The Navy's top spokesmen—although not all of its best-known sea commanders—stand resolutely against any closer consolidation than that now represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They argue that the present setup was evolved by long experience. They suggest that any revision should await mature consideration of the lessons of World War Two. There is also the ever-active apprehension that the naval service, being smaller than the Army, would be swallowed up, together with competitiveness, customs, distinctiveness and tradition, in the proposed merger.

There is something to that naval and marine *esprit de corps*, and it is noteworthy that the still-unrevealed report of the special Joint Chiefs of Staffs committee, while establishing a single department of the armed forces, would allow the naval branch to retain its own Aviation and Marine Corps.

But the more widely held view in the services is that the lesson of World War Two is already apparent, and that it emphasizes and stresses the need for merger. If the hearings bring out what is freely stated

in off-the-record discussion, it will be testified, for instance, that fullest possible co-ordination of sea, air, and ground forces was never attained in any theater of war. Partly this was due to the turmoil of battle and the mobilization of such tremendous aggregations of fighting strength; partly it was due to lack of experience in co-ordination—because the Army and Navy in peacetime had been unco-ordinated entities.

Pearl Harbor is the case most cited, where a Navy Admiral and an Army General never really achieved that unity of command which might have wrung the fullest possible use of both services' limited air-patrol facilities. Conceivably, greater co-ordination might have resulted in some warning against Japan's sneak attack. In some sectors of the ensuing battle across the far reaches of the Pacific, misunderstandings between Admirals and Generals were never wholly ironed out, and there were duplications of effort.

It will also be argued before the Senate committee that, besides increasing battle efficiency, the proposed merger would allow for vastly more standardization of equipment and elimination of duplicate purchasing and procurement. The Senate War Investigating Committee, headed last year by Harry S. Truman, found to its amazement that Army and Navy had then standardized on only 856 items of common use.

The testimony of top enemy officers constitutes one of the best arguments for merger. Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt attributed Germany's defeat in part to lack of co-operation between the German ground forces and the Luftwaffe. "We had continually to go to the Luftwaffe and plead with them," he said. There was no interchange of staff officers between the Luftwaffe and the Reichswehr.

But perhaps Gen. Douglas MacArthur's change of heart most typified the imprint of this war's lessons on the half-century debate. Back in 1932 he expressed the view that merger of the armed forces would weaken the Nation's defenses, "debauch" the Treasury, and "endanger victory for the United States in case of war." Now he publicly favors unity of command.

Letters to The Christian Science Monitor

Prisoner-Returnees

TO THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR:

A poll was taken throughout the Army in an attempt to create a fair point-system for discharging servicemen at the cessation of hostilities. This poll resulted in an extremely well organized and just . . . of that on . . .

want anything served on a silver platter, or a bed of roses; but these additional five points will be a just and deeply appreciated act. We also believe we are safe in stating that the majority of the American public will, unhesitatingly, band with us in this drive.

FIFTEEN PRISONER-RETURNEES
Galethorpe, Ga.