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The principal accomplishment of this Conference was a vote by the Council to admit Greece and Turkey to membership in the North Atlantic alliance. So, it must have been about this that the President was complimenting his Secretary of State.

You will be hearing a great deal more about this subject. Admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Pact will require a change in the Treaty which must be ratified by the United States Senate. There are definitely two sides to the question. I have thought about it a great deal and I seriously question the advisability of doing it.

Of course, there are strong arguments in favor of admitting Greece and Turkey to membership in the North Atlantic Pact. The friendship, and, indeed, the defense of Greece and Turkey are keys to not only the Eastern Mediterranean but the entire Middle East. This is truly a strategic area. It is the axis of 3 continents; the bridgehead between the East and the West; the land gateway from Europe to both Southern Asia, with its tremendous resources of manpower and raw materials, and the continent of Africa, whose vital resources of uranium, manganese, chrome and copper we import in large quantities.

The Middle East has been aptly called "the crossroads of the Eastern Hemisphere."

In addition to its strategic importance in land and sea communication, including the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles, it is equally important in air transport. Every major international air line connecting Asia, Europe, and the United States passes through the Middle East.

The area affords air bases, too, near the industrial heart of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, its resources, particularly in oil, are fabulous. The Near East, itself, contains ½ of the proven oil reserves of the entire world.

The number one argument, then, in favor of admission of Greece and Turkey to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty organization is the strategic importance of the Near East.

The second argument most frequently advanced in favor of this move is that the Turks and the Greeks have demonstrated their willingness to fight for their independence and to fight on the side of the West. The valor of the Turk soldiers in the Korean war is now world renowned. Furthermore, they have demonstrated at home a hardened attitude toward their neighbor, Communist Russia, and have given every indication of a willingness to resist fiercely any encroachment by Russia upon either their territory or their rights.

Just three weeks ago, I had the privilege of seeing some of the Turk army in training in Turkey. I drove through their defenses up to the border of the Iron Curtain. For 50 miles back of the border, every bridge was mined with dynamite; soldiers stood guard at the switches ready to blow up the bridges at the first sign of aggression, and thus impede the advance of either Russian troops or her satellite Bulgarian troops. In the border town of Adrianople, I saw holes bored in the trees along these streets. In these holes, one could see sticks of dynamite. Soldiers stood guard there, too, ready to fell the trees across the streets and roadways at the first sign of aggression. On all sides I saw preparations for defense of their homeland.

I had the feeling that the Turks hated Russia and hated Communism and would not give in without a whale of a fight. I admired them for their will for freedom.

The Greeks, too, in their own war with the Communist directed guerillas demonstrated their determination to resist.

This will for freedom is welcome, indeed. I wish there were more of it in Western Europe.
The third argument in favor of this move is based upon an apprehension of what might happen in case the United States does not give these pact guarantees to Greece and Turkey, more particularly to Turkey. It is said that the Turks want the same kind of guarantees from the United States that have been given to the countries of Western Europe and that if these guarantees are not given there is grave danger that Turkey may revert to a position of neutrality such as she maintained throughout World War II.

The fourth argument is one of time, assuming that some security guarantees are advisable. It is argued that guarantees can be more readily given to Turkey through admission to the NATO than through the creation of regional or other kind of security arrangement.

Now, as I have said, these reasons are strong and powerful. Nevertheless, despite these powerful arguments, I do not believe we should do it. I came back from my trip to the Middle East with a feeling that it would be unwise for the United States to give to Turkey or Greece the commitments implicit in the North Atlantic Treaty.

In the first place, I do not think it is necessary. True, the Turks and the Greeks want to get the United States signed on the dotted line. True, they want all the guarantees they can get. But it does not follow that they will turn either to neutralism or to Communism unless we give these particular guarantees. As I said earlier, I found that the Turks feared and hated both the Russians and Communism. They are bent on resistance. In order to resist, they need aid. We have already given aid; I think we should give more aid, but doubt if it is necessary to go further than that. When Greece and Turkey were threatened four years ago, the United States pledged aid. That pledge of aid was then sufficient to bolster their courage, to steel their nerves and cause them to say no, to shake their fists at the Soviet Union. Why would it be necessary now to do more or go further than to pledge aid to the Turks and the Greeks in their own self defense?

Now, if I am right on this first point; to wit, that it is unnecessary, then I think all other arguments in favor of this further commitment must fall. We are already spread pretty thin.

If this proposed commitment were necessary to save the Middle East from Communism, then I would take the risk.
There are, however, still other valid and very practical arguments against this move.

For instance, the present military equipment is insufficient to arm the men already available in Western Europe, which I regard the site of our primary interest outside the boundaries of the United States. Gen. Eisenhower recently told me that during the next 12 months more men were available in Western Europe than could be supplied with military equipment. The diversion of substantial supplies to the Middle East, then, would appear to have the effect of spreading ourselves thinner, of weakening our position in the area of our primary concern in order to take a step of questionable necessity in an area of secondary, though admittedly important, interest.

The defense of the Eastern Mediterranean is already greatly strengthened by our large naval forces now operating in the Mediterranean.

The present membership in the North Atlantic Treaty is representative of a similar culture - the Western Culture. The people of these nations have, in many respects, a common heritage - the Christian religious faith, kindred political institutions and history, similar social aspirations. Many advantages accrue from this affinity. It is easier for them to work together, live together, get along together.

Furthermore, as long as this homogenous group work together for mutual self defense, there is kept alive the hope, which I cherish, of a broader and more effective political union between them. Only a few days ago, one of the Ministers meeting in Ottawa proposed a common citizenship for the North Atlantic Treaty member nations. The admission of Turkey would bring into the organization a people of differing religion, ethnic origin and political heritage, and, in my opinion, deaden the hope that NATO may emerge into more perfect political and economic unity of the North Atlantic powers.

Then, there is the geographic pattern. Pushing the Western defense frontier 1500 miles eastward to Asia is stretching the North Atlantic neighborhood concept a little far. By no stretch of imagination can Greece and Turkey be considered "Atlantic Countries."

The place to co-operate with Greece and Turkey is in the United Nations - not in the Atlantic Ocean.
NATO is already cumbersome enough. Admission of Greece and Turkey would make it even more unwieldy.

This is not to minimize the importance of the Middle East nor to withdraw from our responsibilities as the preeminent world power. Indeed no. It is, to the contrary, to counsel discretion in undertaking commitments which appear unnecessary and which may prove unwieldy, unworkable and dangerous.

A regional Middle Eastern or Mediterranean security arrangement, permissible under the U. N. charter as is the NATO, with the pledged aid of the United States, would appear preferable.

At any rate, the United States should, in my opinion, retain more freedom of choice of action in case of trouble in the Middle East than would be allowed by the commitments involved in admitting Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Alliance.
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The area affords air bases, too, near the industrial heart of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, its resources, particularly in oil, are fabulous. The Near East, itself, contains $\frac{3}{4}$ of the proven oil reserves of the entire world.

The number one argument, then, in favor of admission of Greece and Turkey to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty organization is the strategic importance of the Near East.

The second argument most frequently advanced in favor of this move is that the Turks and the Greeks have demonstrated their willingness to fight for their independence and to fight on the side of the West. The valor of the Turk soldiers in the Korean war is now world renowned. Furthermore, they have demonstrated at home a hardened attitude toward their neighbor, Communist Russia, and have given every indication of a willingness to resist fiercely any encroachment by Russia upon either their territory or their rights.

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The third argument in favor of this move is based upon an apprehension of what might happen in case the United States does not give these past guarantees to Greece and Turkey, more particularly to Turkey. It is said that the Turks want the same kind of guarantees from the United States that have been given to the countries of Western Europe and that if these guarantees are not given there is grave danger that Turkey may revert to a position of neutrality such as she maintained throughout World War II.

The fourth argument is one of time, assuming that some security guarantees are advisable. It is argued that guarantees can be more readily given to Turkey through admission to the NATO than through the creation of regional or other kind of security arrangement.

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The Number One argument in favor of admission of Greece and Turkey to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty organization is the strategic and resource importance of the Near East.

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